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REGULATION OF MOTOR CARRIERS IN KENTUCKY
BY W. LEwIs ROBETS*
There is probably no branch of public utility law that has
developed more during the past decade than that governing
motor carriers. In fact, the business of the motor carrier did
not fill a very big place in the utility field ten years ago. There
are many very interesting cases in the books today where the
principles first announced in decisions concerning innkeepers
and draymen, who professed to serve all who had goods to be
hauled, have been applied to b-ds and truck lines. It seems
worthwhile to examine the decisions of our own state to see
what progress has already been made and to note the trend of
development. We shall consider:
I. The right of the state to regulate.
II. The purpose of such regulation.
1. To limit competition.
2. To restrict the use of highways and streets.
3. To insure public safety.
4. To provide for satisfaction of legal liability.
III. State regulation of interstate motor carriers.
I. The Right of the State to Regulate Motor Carriers.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has pointed out that the
basis of the right of the state to regulate bus lines and other
motor carriers is the police power.' The legislature passed
laws affecting motor carriers in 1920, 1924, 1926 and 1932. The
statutory provisions in force at the present time are embodied
in the enactment of the 1932 session.2
The limitations on the exercise of the police power to regu-
*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, College of Law. A. B.,
Brown; A. M., Pennsylvania State College; J. D., University of
Chicago; S. J. D., Harvard. Author of various articles in legal
periodicals,
Reo Bus Lines Co. v. Southern Bs Line Co. (1925), 209 Ky. 40,
272 S. W. 18.
2Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, Supplement, Sections 2739g-1 to
2739g-16.
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late motor carriers are found in the federal constitution. The
United States Supreme Court has held that state statutes that
practically demand that private carriers shall be subjected to
all the obligations of common carriers and shall really constitute
themselves common carriers, are unconstitutional and beyond
the power of the states.3 In the Duke case, a Michigan statute
sought to impose all the obligations of common carriers to
furnish indemnity bonds upon private contract carriers engaged
in an interstate business. In the Frost case, a California statute
imposed upon private contract carriers of citrus fruit between
termini within the state, the obligation of first securing certifi-
cates of convenience and necessity. The view taken by the
Supreme Court was that this was an attempt to convert a private
motor carrier operating under a single contract into a common
carrier by legislative fiat, and therefore a contravention of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doubtless
had the constitutionality of the statute been urged on the ground
of the right of a state to regulate or to limit the use of the
highways, especially for highway protection and traffic safety,
the act might have been sustained by the Supreme Court.4
II. The Purpose of Such Regulation.
(1) To limit competition.
In Kentucky, as in nearly all the states of the Union, the
commissioner of motor transportation can limit the number of
motor carriers operating between any two termini by requiring
them to secure from the commission a certificate of convenience
and necessity as a condition precedent to doing business.5 This
limitation on free competition is based upon the fact that ex-
perience has shown that the public interest is better served by
such limitation. Free competition has proved wasteful in the
past and has shown that in the long run the public has had
poorer service.6 An over-investment of capital in competing
lines has to be paid for by the public in the end.
3Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke (1925), 266 U. S.
570, 69 L. ed. 445; Frost v. California Railroad Commission (1926),
271 U. S. 583, 70 L. Ed. 1101.
'J. Byron McCormick, "The Regulation of Motor Transportation,"
22 Cal. L. Rev. 24, at 64.
'Kentucky Statutes (Carroll's Supp.), Sec. 2739j-3.
'Pond, "Public Utilities" (3rd ed.), Sec. 903.
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A surprisingly large number of questions requiring judicial
attention arise under a statutory requirement of a certificate of
convenience and necessity. Under the provision of the act of
1924, a company holding a permit to operate a bus line between
two cities sought to enjoin one from operating five-passenger
cars for hire between the same points without such a permit.
As the act excepted from its provisions vehicles carrying five
passengers or less, an injunction was denied.7 The act of 1926,
however, extended the provisions of the 1924 act so as to include
motor vehicles carrying five passengers or less, and this enact-
ment was held constitutional.8 In one instance, an appellant
contended that a permit should be granted where either con-
venient "or" necessary. The court rejected this contention and
said that the words "necessary or convenient for the public" in
the statute are to be read "necessary and convenient"-"or"
is to be construed as "and'". Where a certificate of convenience
and necessity was awarded by the commissioner on the ground
that such line would be a public convenience, without finding it
was necessary, the Court of Appeals set the award aside. It
must be both convenient and necessary for the public.' 0 The
commissioner's refusal to grant a certificate to operate a bus line
between two points already served by another line on the ground
that it must be convenient and necessary for the pziblic was
sustained on appeal."
The commissioner of motor transportation is not authorized
to grant certificates of convenience and necessity over a line
served by two or more established lines except for insufficiency
of present service and refusal on the part of the established
lines to put on sufficient service. These established lines should
be given a reasonable opportunity to put on sufficient service.
"Reo Bus Lines Co. v. Southern Bus Line Go. (1925), 209 Ky. 40,
272 S. W. 18.
8 Harrison v. Big Four Bus Lines (1926), 217 Ky. 119, 288 S. W.
1049.
9 Red star Transportation Co. v. Red Dot Coach Lines, et al. (1927),
220 Ky. 424, 295 S. W. 419.
C ooper v. McWilliams and Robinson (1927), 221 Ky. 320, 298 S. W.
961.
nBarnes v. Consolid~ated Coach Corp. (1928), 223 Ky. 465, 3 S. W.
(2d) 1087.
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The insufficiency of the bonds given by the present holders of
permits would not be sufficient grounds.12
An injunction against taxicab operators forbidding picking
up passengers at points on a route over which a bus company
held a certificate of convenience, except at the stations of the
operators of taxicabs or where prospective passengers had en-
gaged taxicabs in advance, was sustained. The defendant taxi-
cab operators had made a practice of driving along the bus line
a few minutes before a bus was due and of picking up pro-
spective passengers. This practice the court enjoined.13 Where
a bus line company violates its permit in handling passengers be-
tween the termini of another bus line, the commissioner can
revoke its permit; but where the offending company promptly
made amendments and instructed its drivers not to handle pas-
sengers between such points, the commission was within its
discretion in refusing to revoke the offending company's per-
mit.14 In fact, the commissioner of motor transportation has
wide discretion in determining questions presented in grant-
ing and revoking permits. The mere disappointment of an un-
successful applicant is no ground for disturbing the commis-
sioner's ruling.15
(2) To restrict the use of highways and streets.
It is well settled that a state may regulate the use of its
streets and highways. One writer on public utilities says, "In
fact few legal propositions are more fully and firmly established
than the right of the state in the exercise of its police power to
regulate or prohibit the use of its streets and highways as places
of private business, or as the chief instrumentality of conduct-
ing such business as that of operating motor vehicle systems
for profit."16 To the same effect are the words of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, "Indeed, a citizen may have, under the fed-
eral Constitution, a right to travel and to transport his prop-
erty upon the highways by motor vehicle, but he has no right
"Red Diamond Bus Line Co. v. Cannon Ball Transportation Co.
(1930), 233 Ky. 482, 26 S. W. (2d) 28.
28Hazard Bus Company, et at. v. 'Wells, et al. (1928), 226 Ky. 591,
11 S. W. (2d) 413.
"Blaek Bus Line v. Consolidated Coach Corporation (1930), 235
Ky. 559, 31 S. W. (2d) 917.
3SBlack Bus Line v. Henry, Commissioner (1931), 241 Ky. 602, 44
S. W. (2d) 580.
2Pond, "Public Utilities" (4th ed.), p. 1501.
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to make the highways his place of business by using them as a
common carrier for hire . . . Such use is a privilege which may
be granted or withheld by the state in its discretion without
violating any provision of the state or federal Constitution. The
highways belong to the public, but are primarily for the use
of the public in the ordinary way."11
The size of trucks and maximum loads are prescribed by
the statute. Such regulation has been upheld by the Court of
Appeals.' s Also, city ordinances fixing maximum loads have
been upheld under the act of 1926, which left the matter of
maximum loads on city streets open to regulation by the cities
involved. 19 A municipality has the right to exact reasonable
compensation for use of its streets, and a city is not precluded
from exacting a license from a taxicab driver who operates on
its streets by the fact that he has paid a license fee in an ad-
joining city. 20 It can require a license of a non-resident doing
auto-trucking within the city, although it cannot require one of
a non-resident who merely passes through the city.21 Such an
ordinance, however, requiring licenses for motor trucks operat-
ed for "hire" or compensation, was held not to apply to a
grocery truck used for the owner's individual business.2 2 And
under the act of 1920, a city was allowed to impose a license
tax in addition to an ad valorem tax on automobiles used for
other than business purposes; the proceeds, the statute provided,
should go into the municipal sinking fund.23 Under the act of
1924 it was held a local license could not be required of motor
vehicles used in transporting passengers for hire, even though
"ISlusher v. Safety Coach Transit Co. (1929), 229 Ky. 731, 732,
17 S. W. (2d) 1012.
sAshland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Cor. (1933), 247 Ky. 144, 56
S. W. (2d). 691.
City of Ashland v. Ashland Supply Co. (1928), 225 Ky. 123, 7
S. W. (2d) 1087.
- Town of Fleming v. 'Wright (1928), 225 Ky. 129, 7 S. W. (2d) 832.
Commonwealth V. Kelcy (1929), 229 Ky. 722, 17 S. W. (2d) 1017.
1young & Jones v. Town of Campbellsville (1923), 199 Ky. 284, 250
S. W. 979; W. T. sistrunk & Co. v. Paris (1924), 205 Ky. 835, 266 S. W.
656.
2Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Paris (1931), 240 Ky. 701, 42
S. W. (2d) 904.
-Parke v. City of Louisville (1929), 229 Ky. 186, 16 S. W. (2d)
1034.
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carrying five passengers or less. The statute had exempted them
from local licenses. 24
Bus lines were subject to franchise tax under the statute2
before the amendment of 1926 specifically mentioned them.
This amendment was declaratory of the law then in force.20
An earlier decision, however, held that a transfer company was
not within the provisions of this same section of the statute and,
consequently, was not liable for the franchise tax. It did not
come within the classification of common carriers covered.2 7
Where a bus line was operating in city streets without a fran-
chise a street railway was allowed to maintain a suit as a tax-
payer to restrain the operation of the bus line.28
Finally, an interesting question arose where taxing officials,
having adopted the practice of issuing licenses for trucks based
on manufacturers' ratings and having followed the practice for
several years, attempted to change, without legislative enact-
ment, and to base the license rates on actual carrying capacity.
The court held they could not do this. 29
(3) To insure public safety.
The statutory provisions requiring motor bus drivers to
take examinations and forbidding their driving without having
first secured a license granted after such examinations and also
the provisions providing for inspection of busses and equip-
ment, are to insure the safety of other users of the highways as
well as the safety of passengers and freight transported. 30
Furthermore, carriers of passengers and of freight may
make rules for governing the conduct of their business, but the
reasonableness of such regulations is for the court to determine
and not for the jury. Such rules and regulations, however,
must not conflict with those prescribed by the commissioner.
The Court of Appeals sustained a rule by which seats were re-
served for passengers who had reserved accommodations and
Childress v. Rtggs (1925), 212 Ky. 225, 278 S. W. 575.
2 Ky. Stats., Sec. 4077 (Carroll's 1930).
"Blue Coach Line v. Lewis (1927), 220 Ky. 116, 294 S. W. 1080.
2 Commonwealth v. Louisville Transfer Co. (1918), 181 Ky. 305,
204 S. W. 92.
"People's Transit 00. v. Louisville Railway Co. (1927), 220 Ky.
728, 295 S. W. 1055.
2 State Tax Commissioner v. Safety Transfer Co. (1929), 230 Ky.
225, 18 S. W. (2d) 991.
3 Ky. Stat. Supp. (Carroll's), Secs. 2739j-32, 54, 73, 74, 75, 1-12, 1-14,
1-15.
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who were to be received enroute; also a rule not to take more
passengers than could be seated in the bus.3 1
(4) To provide for satisfaction of legal liability.
That the state may require that an applicant for a certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity shall take out liability in-
surance or give a bond to answer for injuries due to negligence
in operating its busses is upheld as a valid condition to doing
business. Municipalities under statutory authorization may also
require insurance as a condition precedent to-operating taxi-
cabs or other motor vehicles for hire on its streets. This power
has been passed upon several times by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals.3 2 Furthermore, a federal district court, consisting of
three judges, upheld the 1932 statute requiring a contract car-
rier to provide either insurance or bond protection for the pub-
lic as a condition precedent to issuing a permit, and requiring
contract carrierg not to give unreasonable preference to patrons
as compared with patrons of any common carrier.33 The court
said it was controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in
Sproles v. Binford3 4 where the principle was laid down "that
the state has the right in such general motor vehicle regulations
to foster a fair distribution of traffic as between the highways
and the railroads, to the end that all necessary facilities shall
be maintained and that the public shall not be inconvenienced
by inordinate uses of the highways for purposes of gain.' ' 5
III. State Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers.
(1) Use of highways.
While the regulation of interstate commerce is vested by
the Constitution in Congress, nevertheless, state regulation may
and does affect interstate motor carriers. The limits within
which the state may act are not clearly defined, and interesting
questions are constantly arising in regard to such limits. The
United States Supreme Court has held states may limit the
size and weight of motor vehicles used on public highways, and
1Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp. (1931), 240 Ky. 1, 40 S. W.
(2d) 356.
fCaines v. 'Wheeler (1925), 207 Ky. 237, 268 S. W. 1098; Kentucky
Cab Go. v. City of LouisvilZe (1929), 230 Ky. 216, 18 S. W. (2d) 992;
CommonweaZth V. Kefly (1929), 229 Ky. 722, 17 S. W. (2d) 1017.
1 Baker v. Glenn (1933), 2 Fed. Supp. 880.
286 U. S. 374, 52 S. Ct. 581, 76 L. Ed. 1167.
'sAt page 882.
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this is so even where operated over federal-aided highways 386
It is possible that the Supreme Court would sustain state legis-
lation forbidding the use of its highways by common carriers
altogether.37 The Supreme Court has held that a state may
prescribe uniform regulations necessary for safety and order in
respect to the operation of motor vehicles on its highways, in-
cluding those moving in interstate commerce.38 The court held
constitutional a statute providing that a non-resident owner of
an automobile should appoint the secretary of state his attorney
upon whom process might be served "in any action or legal
proceeding caused by the operation of his registered motor
vehicle within this state, against such owner."9 The court has
also said that a state may impose as a condition precedent to the
use of its highways, bonding and insurance requirements upon
interstate carriers. 4 0
Two decisions of the United States Supreme Court have
set limitations to the power of states to impose regulations on
interstate commerce; Buck v. Kuykendall 4' and Bush Co. v.
Mfaloy,42 decided the same day. In the former case the state of
Washington refused a certificate of convenience to one Buck
over its highways, on the route between Seattle and Portland,
Oregon, on the ground that the territory was adequately served.
The Supreme Court held that the state of Washington could not
restrict competition in interstate motor transportation. In the
latter case a statute of Maryland prohibited common carriers of
merchandise or freight by motor vehicle from using public high-
ways over specified routes without a permit, and it was held
unconstitutional as to a common carrier exclusively engaged
in interstate commerce. In the first case the highways over
which the applicant for a permit wished to operate were built
" Morris v. Duby (1927), 274 U. S. 135, 47 Sup. Ct. 548, 71 L. ed.
966; Sproles v. .Btnford (1932), 286 U. S. 374, 52 Sup. Ct. 581, 76
L. Ed. 1167.
31 Packard v. Benton (1923), 264 U. S. 140, 144; 44 Sup. Ct. 257, 68
L. Ed. 596; Stephenson v. Binford (1932), 287 U. S. 251, 264; 53 Sup. Ct.
181, 77 L. Ed. 203.
-Hendrick v. State o1 Maryland (1915), 235 U. S. 610, 35 Sup. Ct.
140, 59 L. Ed. 385.
"Kane v. New Jersey (1916), 242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30, 61 L. Ed.
222.
Sprout v. South Bend (1928), 277 U. S. 163, 48 Sup. Ct. 502, 72
L. Ed. 833.(1925) 267 U. S. 307, 45 Sup. Ct. 324, 69 L. Ed. 623.
(1925) 267 U. S. 317, 45 Sup. Ct. 326, 69 L. Ed. 627.
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with federal aid, but in the second they were not, so nothing
turned on that fact. Mr. Justice McReynolds gave the dissent-
ing opinion, basing his dissent upon the need of state regulation
in the absence of federal legislation on the subject. Mr. Justice
Brandeis, in speaking for the majority, conceded that a state
might possibly deny the use of its highways to common car-
riers altogether; that the state may make provisions appropriate
for securing the safety and convenience of the public in the use
of its highways; that it may impose fees with a view both to rais-
ing funds to pay for construction and maintenance; and that
it may limit the size and weight of vehicles and exclude unneces-
sary ones. However, in a very recent case, the Supreme Court,
again speaking through Mvir. Justice Brandeis, somewhat quali-
fied its holding in these earlier cases and held that a state may
refuse a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate
as a common carrier of property in interstate commerce over
a certain route. The court assumed that there were other routes
open to the applicant, since the duty to show the contrary rested
upon him.43
Several times the Kentucky C6urt of Appeals has passed
upon the right of the state to regulate the use of the state high-
ways by interstate motor carriers. It has held that before an
interstate carrier can engage in interstate business, the com-
mission must find that public necessity as well as public con-
venience requires the granting of a permit. 44 It has said that
the state may restrain, prohibit, or condition a special and
extraordinary use of the highways without violating any pro-
visions of state or federal Constitution,45 and that a municipal-
ity under the statute of 1926 might compel a motor bus operator,
even though engaged in interstate business, to pay a license,
where he had not complied with that act and put himself within
the provision providing exemption from local licenses.4 6 Also,
where, under the same act, a taxi owner operating between two
1BradZey v. Public Utilities Commission (1933), 289 U. S. 92, 53
Sup. Ct. 577, 77 L. Ed. 1053
"Shorty's Bus Line v. Gibbs Bus Line, Inc. (1931), 237 Ky. 494,
35 S. W. (2d) 868.
4'6lusher v. Safety Coach Transit Co. (1929), 229 Ky. 731, 17 S. W.
(2d) 1012.
4 Northern Ky. Tram. Co. v. City of BeZlevue (1926), 215 Ky. 574,
285 S. W. 241.
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states had not applied for a certificate as a bus operator, the
court said he should have been enjoined from engaging in every
form of transportation along the bus route of the complainant
partnership.-17
A further limitation was pointed out by a three-judge
federal district court, which held that the state commissioner
of motor transportation could not limit an applicant for a
certificate to engage in exclusively interstate business, to two
interstate round trips per day instead of four, the number ap-
plied for, on the ground that additional trips would seriously
affect safety of travel on the highway and seriously impair the
road bed.48 Some states, including Kentucky, specify the
routes of interstate motor carriers. This practice has been up-
held in at least one state court.49
(2) Taxation.
Three interesting United States Supreme Court decisions
bearing upon the right of a state to tax in the case of interstate
motor carriers are, Helson v. Kentucky, 50 Eastern Air Trans-
port, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 51 and Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace.52  In the first, the
Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, 53 sustaining a statute imposing a tax on gasoline con-
sumed in operating a ferry on the Ohio river between points in
Illinois and Kentucky. As three-fifths of the distance lay in
Kentucky, the tax was imposed on three-fifths of the gasoline
consumed. The statute was held unconstitutional, as it im-
posed a tax on an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Mr.
Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, said:
"A tax, which falls directly upon the use of one of the means by
which commerce is carried on, directly burdens the commerce. If a
tax cannot be laid by a state upon the interstate transportation of the
subjects of commerce, as this Court definitely has held, it is little more
than repetition to say that such a tax cannot be laid upon the use of
a medium by which such transportation is effected.""4
41 Criger & Stepp v. Allen (1927), 219 Ky. 254, 292 S. W. 811.
'gMagntson v. Kelly (D. C. E. D. Ky. 1927), 35 Fed. (2d) 867.
'*Newport Electric Corporation v. Oakley (1925), 47 R. I. 19, 129
A. 613.(1929), 278 U. S. 245, 49 Sup. Ct. 112, 73 L, Ed. 311.
(1932) 285 U. S. 147, 52 Sup. Ct. 340, 76 L. Ed. 673.
(1933) 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. Ed. 730.
-225 Ky. 45.
" At page 252.
X L. J.-4
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In the second case in upholding a special tax on the sale
of gasoline made to an interstate air transport company for
consumption in interstate carriage, Mr. Justice Hughes ob-
served:
"A non-discriminatory tax upon local sales in such cases has never
been regarded as imposing a direct burden upon interstate commerce
and has no greater or different effect upon that commerce than a gen-
eral property tax to which all those enjoying the protection of the
state may be subjected."16
The last case concerned a Tennessee tax upon gasoline
brought into the state by a railroad company and stored there
until used in interstate commerce. Mr. Justice Stone said:
"We cannot say that the tax is a forbidden burden on interstate
commerce because appellant uses the gasoline, subsequent to the inci-
dence of the tax, as an instrument of interstate commerce. Taxes said
to burden interstate commerce directly when levied upon or measured
by the operation of interstate commerce or gross receipts derived from
it, are beyond the state taxing power."' 6
This was a tax upon gasoline in storage and "so was a part of
the common mass of goods within the state, subject to local
taxation."
A note writer in the Yale Law Journal very nicely sum-
marizes the power of a state to tax interstate motor carriers in
these words:
"For state taxation imposed upon operators of vehicles engaged in
interstate commerce by motor yehicle to be valid under the commerce
clause of the Constitution, three general requirements must be met.
The tax must be imposed for a proper purpose, it must be reasonable
in amount, and it must not be discriminatory against interstate com-
merce."5
'Where the fund raised by the tax is used in building or main-
taining highways or for the expenses incurred in administrating
the highway department and does not place an undue portion
of the burden on interstate motor carriers, the state taxing
statute will be upheld.58 Furthermore, Mr. Justice Brandeis
pointed out in Clark v. Poor that "since the tax is assessed for
a proper purpose and is not objectionable in amount, the use to
'5At page 341.
T At page 267.
42 Yale L. Jour. 402.
5 Hendrick v. Maryland, supra, note 38; Kane v. Yew Jersey, supra,
note 39; Prouty v. Coyne (1932), 55 F. (2d) 289; Clark v. Poor (1926),
274 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct. 702, 71 L. Ed. 1199; Continental Baking Co.
v. Woodring (1921), 266 U. S. 352, 52 Sup. Ct. 595, 76 L. Ed. 1155.
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which the proceeds are put is not a matter which concerns the
plaintiffs (the carriers).' ,5
CONCLUSEON
Under its police power, the state may regulate the use of
motor vehicles on its highways. It may require motor carriers
to secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity and
such permit is to be granted for the convenience and necessity
of the public and there must not only be a convenience to the
public shown, but a necessity. The driver for a motor carrier
must secure a license to operate granted after an examination
as to his fitness for such work. The commissioner may route
such carriers and inspect the busses and trucks used. Such
carriers may be taxed to raise funds for building and main-
taining highways and may be required to furnish bonds or
insurance to indemnify passengers, shippers or other users of
the highways against damage from injuries sustained through
the negligence of such carriers. Furthermore, competition be-
tween carriers may be limited, and taxicab drivers or other
carriers may be enjoined from picking up passengers along the
route assigned to a carrier under a permit, or may revoke a
permit of another carrier who has violated his certificate of
convenience. The state may also regulate or limit the size and
weight of vehicles used on the highway.
The legislature may delegate the power to license or regu-
late the use of motor vehicles on its streets to a municipality.
Before the recent statutes such regulation was delegated to the
municipalities in Kentucky. A carrier of passengers or freight
may make reasonable regulations governing the conduct of his
business.
A state may make regulations affecting the use of its high-
ways by interstate carriers, although the limits to which such
regulation may be carried are not clearly defined. The court
has said that a state might possible forbid the use of its high-
ways to common carriers altogether. It may prescribe uniform
regulations necessary for the safe and orderly use of its high-
ways. The United States Supreme Court has said a state can-
not deny an interstate carrier a certificate of convenience. It
5At page 557.
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has said it may deny the use of a specific route, however. Finally,
a state may assess a tax on such carriers to make them bar
their fair proportion of the expense of building and maintaining
the highways.
